Politics in Flux
(Editor’s note: This piece first appeared in Law & Liberty on November 13, 2024.)
One prominent political commentator asserted that the presidential election was anxiety-inducing for many Americans. This is because the contest was “angry and abusive.” And “society” is now “torn to pieces.” And if that wasn’t enough to stress people out, how the campaign unfolded in the months leading up to Election Day provides more evidence that the nation’s two political parties “are wrecked from top to bottom.” The results suggest that “a great political revolution seems impending.”
While this commentary may sound like it refers to this year’s contest between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris, the election in question happened in 1884, not 2024. The commentator was Henry Adams—the grandson and great-grandson of former presidents John Quincy and John Adams, respectively. Adams was referring to the especially negative presidential contest between the Democratic governor of New York, Grover Cleveland, and Republican James G. Blaine. Blaine—who had previously served as secretary of state, Speaker of the House, and senator from Maine—lost his bid for the nation’s highest office. Cleveland, on the other hand, prevailed in the Electoral College and became the first Democrat to win the presidency since before the Civil War.
Trump defeated Harris in 2024 after winning both the popular vote and the Electoral College. His sweeping victory makes Trump only the second person in American history to be elected to two non-consecutive terms as president. Cleveland was the first.
There are many similarities like this one between these two elections and between Cleveland and Trump. Taken together, they remind us that electoral politics is not a static phenomenon driven by concrete group identities. Partisan coalitions are in constant flux as individuals—not groups—decide for themselves which candidates to support in specific situations at particular points in time. The 1884 presidential election is therefore a useful lens through which to examine Trump’s sweeping 2024 victory and what it means for American politics moving forward.
Cleveland and Trump each started in the hurly-burly world of New York politics. Both men avoided military service and had successful careers in the private sector before seeking elected office. People called Cleveland—whose first name was Stephen, not Grover—”Big Steve.” Like Trump, he had a larger-than-life physical presence.
Cleveland’s first White House bid was also rocked by scandal like Trump’s. Revelations that he fathered a child out-of-wedlock with Maria Halpin ten years earlier nearly scuttled his presidential aspirations after Halpin accused Cleveland of sexual assault, and after Cleveland admitted to being “illicitly acquainted” with her. Cleveland’s opponents tried unsuccessfully to use his sexual peccadilloes to defeat his White House bid. However, as in Trump’s case, accusations of scandalous behavior would not be enough to stop Cleveland.
The circumstances that helped make Cleveland’s non-consecutive terms possible underscore why Trump prevailed in this year’s presidential contest. Both candidates were successful thanks to rising populist dissatisfaction with the nation’s political class. And populist sentiment in the electorate, in turn, drove Cleveland and Trump to take stands on issues that many of their partisan allies in Congress opposed. Despite dividing their parties, Cleveland and Trump succeeded in their White House bids precisely because they took strong stands on new issues that cut across traditional partisan lines and spoke to the concerns of individual voters—not separate groups. Cleveland’s pledge to fight political corruption earned him the support of middle-class Democrats and Republicans. And his no-nonsense bid to reward hard work and make the federal government operate more efficiently appealed to voters across demographic lines in both parties.
Groups still matter in American politics, of course. The disaffected Republicans who backed Cleveland—Mugwumps—helped the New York governor win his home state and, ultimately, the presidency. However, group identity does not determine political choice. The disaffected Republicans who backed Cleveland in 1884 did not do so because they were Mugwumps. They were Mugwumps because they backed Cleveland. Their group “identity” did not precede their political choice, much less determine it.
Group identity does not determine political choice even in instances when the identities in question are based on race or class. Like Cleveland, Trump prevailed by appealing to a motley-crew coalition of individual voters, at least judging by traditional partisan orthodoxies. That is, the former president won a second term after losing his first bid to return to the White House in 2020, partly by out-performing past Republican candidates among demographic groups like Hispanic and African American voters that have historically supported Democrats. Trump’s support among both groups increased by nearly 10 percent. He won a larger share of the youth vote. And he increased his support among white, non-college-educated working-class voters in the former “Blue Wall” states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Harris similarly increased Democrats’ support among college-educated white voters in urban and suburban areas.
As Cleveland did before him, Trump won a larger share of demographic groups that historically supported the other party because he spoke to issues that the individuals who composed those groups cared about, like the economy and inflation, immigration, and foreign policy. And like Cleveland, he won because his opponent underperformed among those same individuals who have usually supported the other party’s candidate, like minorities and young Americans.
The 1884 and 2024 presidential election results are an essential reminder that America’s political battle lines are not set in stone and that demographics are not destiny. Whatever one’s position on the major issues front and center in American politics today, the unorthodox success of Cleveland and Trump is a testament to the power of individual voters to make up their own minds about who to support in an election and why.
Trump’s success—like Cleveland’s—is a sobering wake-up call for America’s political and pundit class to rethink many of their own biases regarding group identities, partisan polarization, and the public policies they think the people care about most. Using short-cuts like “identity politics” or concepts like that of a rigidly polarized America to explain away the nuances and complexity of political behavior in a free society may make their job of explaining that behavior to others easier. But “easier” does not mean that their explanation is right.
Demographic shifts and economic growth (or decline) will certainly influence American politics moving forward. It would be absurd to suggest otherwise. But that influence will not determine what happens in American politics per se. Rather, it will be filtered through the choices that individual voters make in elections and in-between elections. Group identity will be one of countless factors that help to explain why an individual will act in a specific way at a particular time. Consequently, focusing just on group identity subsumes individual difference to demographic categories and, in the process, blinds us to all of the other influences that—when taken together—account for political action.
There are differences between Cleveland and Trump and the elections that propelled them to the White House. For example, Cleveland called for lower tariffs and Trump wants to raise them. But those differences obscure their underlying similarities. And only by trying to explain those similarities can we appreciate the fluid nature of electoral politics in a free society and clearly perceive the constantly shifting coalitions that make up the Democratic and Republican parties. That would help Americans better understand what the next chapter of their political story holds. Things change. Cleveland and Trump’s unconventional success suggests that business-as-usual politics is changing, whether the political class likes it or not. Whatever happens next is going to be up to the American people—as individuals—to decide.